Following Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and his subsequent turn toward the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration authorized the CIA to begin training a force of anti-Castro Cuban exiles for a covert invasion, a plan inherited and ultimately approved by the incoming Kennedy administration. On April 17, 1961, roughly 1,400 CIA-trained exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's southern coast, expecting American air support and a popular uprising against Castro's government.
Both expectations failed to materialize as planned. Kennedy, wary of overt American involvement being exposed, scaled back promised air support at a critical moment, and the anticipated internal uprising never occurred — Castro's government had already arrested thousands of suspected dissidents in the days before the invasion, and the general Cuban population showed no sign of the widespread anti-Castro sentiment the CIA's planning had assumed. Castro's forces, personally directing the response, surrounded and defeated the invasion force within three days; most of the exile brigade was killed or captured. The failure was a severe international embarrassment for Kennedy's young administration, and its most consequential effect was arguably psychological: Castro, having just repelled a US-backed invasion, moved decisively closer to the Soviet Union for protection, a relationship that, within eighteen months, led directly to the Soviet Union secretly placing nuclear missiles in Cuba — the trigger for the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the closest the Cold War came to direct nuclear conflict.