The popular image of internet traffic traveling primarily via satellite is largely wrong: the overwhelming majority of intercontinental data, including nearly all transatlantic and transpacific traffic, physically travels through undersea fiber-optic cables — around 500-600 active cables globally as of the mid-2020s, some of them decades old, carrying everything from ordinary web traffic to financial transactions to military and diplomatic communications. Certain geographic chokepoints, such as the waters around Egypt connecting Europe to Asia, the English Channel, and various points around Southeast Asia, concentrate a disproportionate number of these cables into relatively narrow corridors.
Cable damage is not a hypothetical concern — it happens with some regularity already, mostly from ship anchors, fishing trawlers, and occasional natural events like undersea earthquakes, and cable repair ships exist specifically to locate and fix these routine breaks, typically restoring service within days to a couple of weeks depending on weather and ship availability. What has increasingly worried security officials in several countries is the deliberate, coordinated version of this vulnerability: several incidents since 2023 in the Baltic Sea, involving cables being severed in circumstances that investigators in multiple countries have publicly linked to suspected state-linked sabotage, have raised serious concern about whether a coordinated, multi-cable attack — deliberately targeting several major routes simultaneously, rather than a single incidental break — could cause disruption on a scale the existing repair infrastructure, built around handling occasional individual breaks, was never designed to handle.